​​​
​
​
Articles and chapters
​
[1] Aiding the impermissible? Kant and the morality of medical assistance in dying
Accepted at Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
​
[2] Duties to self in §2 of Kant's Doctrine of Virtue
History of Philosophy Quarterly, 42(2) 193-204.
​
In § 2 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant appears to claim that duties to self have primacy over duties owed to others. This paper critically examines a reading of Kant according to which duties to self have primacy because all duties are self-imposed and a duty is owed to the lawgiver. Instead, Kant is claiming that a feature of duties to self that supposedly makes them contradictory is shared by duties to others. To deny the existence of duties to self on the basis that they possess that feature would therefore also rule out duties to others.
​
​
[3] Duties to self, consent, and respect in Kant's moral philosophy
Journal of Moral Philosophy, Online first, 1-24.
​
​In Kantian ethics, do we wrong someone when our use of them requires that they violate a duty to self, even when they have consented to that use? In this paper, I answer this question in the negative. Consent that constitutes a violation of a duty to self is impermissible yet normatively transformative. But it also matters how consent was obtained. For example, it matters whether consent is solicited or unsolicited, whether our action amounts to complicity with the violation, and how the act of consent is shaped by the broader contours of the relationship the parties stand in to each other. In Kantian terms, we might fail in our duties of respect to others even when our interactions with them are consensual. So many, but not all, consensual interactions in which one person violates a duty to self are also instances in which they are interpersonally wronged.
​
​
[4] Authority and acquisition: Kant on property in the state of nature
Property Law and Theory (2024) Edward Elgar Publishing. 142-154.
​
In this chapter, I engage with Kant’s theory of property by examining a condition in which he says we fail to have conclusive property rights: the state of nature. I argue against a recent proposal that property rights are inconclusive because individuals lack the authority to acquire property in the state of nature. Instead, property rights are subject to disputes that no individual has the authority to adjudicate and require guarantees of reciprocity that no individual can provide.
​
[5] Active citizenship and Kantian republicanism
The Kantian Subject: New Interpretative Essays (2023) Routledge. 161-79.
​
Kant draws a distinction between active and passive citizens. Active citizens are members of a state who possess rights of political participation. Passive citizens, while they are protected by the laws of the state, do not have such rights. While much of the literature on Kant's account of citizenship has focused on the important question of who counts as an active citizen, much less attention has been paid to the rights of political participation gained by active citizens. This chapter explores this latter issue. Understanding the nature of active citizenship is important for a full understanding of Kant's republicanism. This is because it specifies exactly how members of a state are permitted to contribute to shaping its laws.
​
[6] Kant on civil self-sufficiency
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 105:1 (2023) 118-140.
​
Kant distinguishes between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens and holds that only the former are civilly self-sufficient and possess rights of political participation. Such rights are important, since for Kant state institutions are a necessary condition for individual freedom. Thus, only active citizens are entitled to contribute to a necessary condition for the freedom of each. I argue that Kant attributes civil self-sufficiency to those who are not under the authority of any private individual for their survival. This reading is more textually grounded than the dominant reading, which understands civil self-sufficiency in terms of economic relations alone. I further argue that Kant was interested in relations of authority because he was concerned to eliminate certain forms of corruption. This indicates that Kant’s contested distinction between active and passive citizens was a response to a key problem of any account of public lawgiving.
​
European Journal of Philosophy, 29:2 (2021) 323- 338.
​
Kant's characterisation of honeste vive as an unenforceable duty of right owed to oneself poses two systematic problems: it conflicts with Kant's claims that (a) duties of right concern the external relation between distinct individuals and (b) duties of right are externally enforceable. Both of these claims speak against the possibility of a duty of right to oneself. This article addresses this interpretative problem. Regarding (a) I suggest that while honeste vive is a duty owed to oneself, the content of the duty concerns one's interaction with others. Regarding (b) I maintain that honeste vive is a general duty of right, and such duties are not externally enforceable. This view both allows for an understanding of the structure of obligation in the Doctrine of Right as a whole and forces us to reconsider two central aspects of Kant's concept of right—namely, that all rights are externally enforceable and owed to others. Not only does honeste vive belong to the Doctrine of Right but understanding the way in which it does can illuminate the significance and scope of duties belonging to Kant's political philosophy.
​​
[8] Kant on welfare: 5 unsuccessful defences
Kantian Review, 25:1 (2020) 1- 25.
​
This article discusses five attempts at justifying the provision of welfare on Kantian grounds. I argue that none of the five proposals is satisfactory. Each faces a serious challenge on textual or systematic grounds. The conclusion to draw from this is not that a Kantian cannot defend the provision of welfare. Rather, the conclusion to draw is that the task of defending the provision of welfare on Kantian grounds is a difficult one whose success we should not take for granted.
​
[9] A Kantian Defense of the Right to Health Care
Kantian Theory and Human Rights (2014) Routledge. 70-88.
​​
In Kantian political philosophy external freedom, understood as the ability to take up means toward the attainment of ends we have set for ourselves, is secured through the three branches of the republican state. Indeed, the state is necessary for the exercise of this freedom. However, in order to provide a condition consistent with the original contract, further institutions are required; in this paper, I argue that a health care system is one of those institutions.
​​
Monograph
Kant on Duties to Self
In progress and under contract for the Elements in the Philosophy of Kant series. Cambridge University Press. ​
​​
Book reviews​
Review of Jakob Huber's Kant's Grounded Cosmopolitanism
Jurisprudence, 14(2) (2023) 309-316.
​
Dissertation
Kant on citizenship
DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2019
​
​​
​
Public Writing​​
​
​
[1] Upcoming. An interview with Jake Wright on teaching philosophy and ‘naïve scepticism’, for LSE Higher Education blog.
​
[2] 2021. ‘No grades, no degree classes, just pass/fail’ for LSE Higher Education blog.
​
[3] 2021. ‘A modest proposal: the case for a pass/fail first year at the LSE’ for LSE Contemporary Issues in Teaching and Learning Blog.
​
[4] 2021. ‘Options for teaching the western canon: no more `Plato to NATO’ style courses’ for LSE Contemporary Issues in Teaching and Learning Blog.
​
[5] 2015. ‘Should Vegetarians Consider Eating Insects?’ in Alternative Diets. Cambridge: Independence Educational Publishers, 32-33.
​
[6] 2015. ‘Child Euthanasia Should Be Allowed’ in Opposing Viewpoints: Euthanasia, Gale: Cengage Learning, 35-40.
​
[7] February 2015. ‘The Fundamental Elements of Rights’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[8] January 2015. ‘Aboriginal rights and refusal of treatment in Canada’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[9] November 2014. ‘A Methodological Worry for ‘Top Down’ Accounts of Human Rights’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[10] October 2014. ‘The Humane and the Ethical in Animal Research’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[11] September 2014. ‘On the Supposed Importance of Cultural Traditions for Whaling Practice’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[12] July 2014. ‘Principles for the Legalisation of Trade in Rhino Horn’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[13] June 2014. ‘Should Vegetarians Consider Eating Insects?’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[14] May 2014. ‘On Canada’s Proposed Bill C-24: the So-Called ‘Strengthening Canadian Citizenship’ Act’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[15] March 2014. ‘Reconsidering the Ethics of Enhanced Punishment’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[16] February 2014. ‘Private Lives, Dying Wishes, and Technological Development’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[17] January 2014. ‘Three Arguments Against the Belgian Child Euthanasia Bill, Criticised’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[18] October 2013. ‘Can we have an Interest Theory of Rights for Animals, and a Will Theory for Humans?’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[19] October 2013. ‘Can a Person in a Vegetative State get Married?’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
[20] September 2013. ‘Should Some People be Barred from Pursuing Higher Education?’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​​
[21] August 2013. ‘Political Change and the Olympic Games’ University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics blog ‘Ethics in the News’
​
​
​
​